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Abstract 
This Policy Insight examines the Hungarian government’s responses to the coronavirus 
pandemic and their impacts on the rule of law. It argues that the pandemic does not create 
autocracies, but it shows more clearly their true illiberal colours.  
The paper assesses the scope of the so-called ‘Enabling Act’ granting the government the power 
to rule by decree and its damaging implications for the effective democratic control of 
executive actions and other checks and balances such as media pluralism and freedom of 
association. The analysis argues that the Hungarian government is unequivocally violating the 
EU founding principles enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and its current 
pandemic politics are making this ever more transparent.  
The paper recommends more EU centralisation and interinstitutional cooperation in the 
assessment and scrutiny of all member states’ compliance with the trinity of the rule of law, 
democracy and fundamental rights. It concretely suggests first, the timely enforcement of EU 
standards by the European Commission and the Luxembourg Court through rule of law 
infringement proceedings, and second, the adoption of an interinstitutional EU Periodic Review 
(EUPR) on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights. 
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1. Introduction 
Coronavirus politics are spreading across the European Union. As a result of Covid-19, at the 
time of writing more than half of EU member states have introduced “states of emergency, 
alarm or danger” derogating fundamental constitutional checks and balances, individual rights 
and civil liberties (Carrera and Chun Luk, 2020). Authoritarians across the world are seizing the 
chance to introduce old and other ‘creative’ measures, from large-scale digital surveillance to 
doing away with national parliaments, judicial control and freedom of the press under the 
pretext of fighting the pandemic. 
Extraordinary times might call for extraordinary measures, but they must not mean dismantling 
the founding principles liberal democracies are based on, such as the trinity of democracy, the 
rule of law and fundamental rights. These three values cannot be separated without inflicting 
harm on one another (Carrera, Guild and Hernanz, 2013).  
Democracy must be understood in a context of checks and balances for legitimate executive 
action. The essence of the rule of law and fundamental rights are meant to prevent abuse of 
power and human rights violations. 
Democracy is about enabling and conducting meaningful critical debates and governments 
having to justify their actions. This is only possible if people have access to information (Bayer 
et al., 2019; Blockmans and Russack, 2020), and if effective venues for democratic 
accountability and judicial control are effectively sustained. Scientific knowledge, cost-benefit 
analyses and impact assessments constitute a central tenet and need to be reinstated as 
rational elements of the system. Individuals need to remain alert to the scope and effects of 
both old and new policy measures on their lives and liberties. 
Even if a policy measure has been found to be ‘effective’ in responding to a public health need, 
the wider ramifications must also be considered for it to be deemed ‘legitimate in a democratic 
society’, chiefly its impacts on the rule of law and human rights. Moreover, placing emphasis 
on one policy or another is a government prerogative, but the procedure culminating in making 
that decision should be transparent as well as open to scrutiny and regular reassessment.  
When people are frightened or panic – whether rationally or due to government- or media-
induced fears, or a combination of these – they are ready to abandon rational decision-making 
and confer their most cherished liberties and rights (for which previous generations fought so 
hard) to a ‘father figure’ who claims to protect them. Also, while presented as ‘temporary’, such 
measures may in fact become more permanent and long term than what is initially portrayed, 
and may be a point of no return. 
The Hungarian government has come under the spotlight after passing the so-called ‘Enabling 
or Authorisation Act’, declaring a state of danger in the country owing to Covid-19. But Hungary, 
once a poster child of transition, ceased to be a liberal democracy a long time ago. Pandemics 
never create autocracies – rather, they reveal such a system’s true colours. 
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This paper examines the Hungarian government’s political responses to the coronavirus 
pandemic. After briefly showing how the Hungarian government has abused each crisis during 
the past 10 years (section 2), the ‘Enabling Act’ is summarised, listing both what the law claims 
to do, and what it actually does (section 3).  
The paper argues that Hungary has violated the basic tenets of European integration, and 
endangers the Union. Section 4 examines the EU responses so far and concludes that action by 
the EU institutions and by political party groups in the European Parliament has come too late, 
been too little and too political (Carrera and Bárd, 2018). Due to its silence and lack of timely 
enforcement, the Commission has rendered itself irrelevant in upholding the rule of law (Bárd 
and Carrera, 2017).  
Section 5 concludes by considering what EU instruments and procedures could be used to 
respond to rule of law decline. It argues that more EU centralisation in the assessment, scrutiny 
and support of member states’ compliance with the rule of law and fundamental rights is crucial 
for the Union to have any future as a democratic value-based community.  
In particular, the EU should activate rule of law infringement proceedings enforcing EU 
standards, under the scrutiny of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). There 
should also be a legally binding interinstitutional agreement between the Commission, the 
European Parliament and the European Council operationalising a common and consistent EU 
Periodic Review (EUPR) of the state of the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights. 
2. A pandemic does not create autocracies 
Let us recall that Hungarian democracy has been in decline for at least a decade. Today, all 
relevant international and European reviews and indices show that it has ceased to be a liberal 
democracy based on the rule of law.  
There has been a continuous decline, and by now Hungary is considered to be the worst 
member state, whether one consults the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index (World Justice 
Project, 2020), rankings by Sustainable Governance Indicators, the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s 
assessment with regard to civil rights and political liberties, the academic freedom index 
(Kinzelbach et al., 2020) or implementation of judgments by the European Court of Human 
Rights.  
Last year a point was reached, where – according to a Freedom House report – for the first time 
since the democratic transition started in 1989-90, and for the first time in EU history, an EU 
member state was downgraded from a free to a partly free country (Freedom House, 2019). 
It is not that declared crises create autocracies. Hungary has for a long time abandoned values 
it promised to share and promote when acceding to the EU and signing the Lisbon Treaty 
respectively. The pandemic has just made the shift towards authoritarianism more visible. 
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Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is famous for jumping on every political crisis, whether resulting 
from a financial, migration or health emergency, using and abusing it. Constitution-making, for 
example, was not on the agenda during the 2010 election 
campaign. Yet, the Fidesz party justified it right after forming a 
government by a need to respond to the 2008 financial crisis, to 
fight a wage war and to lower Hungary’s public debt. 
In a dubious procedure it then passed the new controversial 
constitution, entitled Fundamental Law, entering into force on 
1 January 2012 (Bárd and Pech, 2019). The same ‘crisis’ also 
justified preventing the Hungarian Constitutional Court (HCC) from reviewing financial laws, 
which continues today (Kovács, 2020b).  
In 2015, another state of emergency was declared due to the so-called ‘refugee humanitarian 
crisis’ on the basis of a vague Article 15(1) of the Hungarian Fundamental Law authorising the 
government to exercise powers that are not expressly conferred to another body. The 
respective law introduced the term “crisis situation caused by mass immigration”, which can 
be declared if the number of asylum seekers in Hungary is a least 500 per day for a month, 750 
per day for two weeks or 800 per day for a week. The emergency has been prolonged again 
and again up to now, even though asylum seekers can no longer enter Hungary, and indeed the 
average Hungarian has never met one (Reporting Democracy, 2020). 
The next ‘war’ is waged against another invisible enemy, but this time a very real one, Covid-
19. Applying war rhetoric, the Coronavirus Operational Group set up by the Hungarian 
government consists of more military than healthcare professionals (Kovács, 2020a). And 
despite the fact that what we are witnessing is far from a war-like situation, the use of this 
political rhetoric means in practice an increased military 
presence in strategic companies, in critical industries and 
hospitals. Anyone who is under curfew must stick a large red 
sign on her door in a rather stigmatising manner, invoking the 
worst memories of another European war. 
3. The Hungarian ‘Enabling Act’ 
The government declared a ‘state of danger’ via Government Decree 40/2020 of 11 March 
2020, again on the basis of the vague Article 15(1) of the Fundamental Law. The decree also 
cited the state of danger clause in Article 53 as a legal basis, but that provision does not list a 
pandemic or epidemic as a source of danger, which explains the additional reference to the 
flexible constitutional clause of Article 15(1).  
Accordingly, 15 days after its introduction, parliament has the power to extend the force of 
governmental emergency decrees. As a general rule, decrees cease to be in effect after 14 days, 
and prolongation of their effect can happen for a limited period. Fidesz has the required 
parliamentary majority to prolong the state of danger; moreover, opposition parties would 
have agreed to extend the rule by decree for 90 days. But Orbán wanted more. 
During the last decade, the 
Hungarian government ceased  
to be a liberal democracy and to 
uphold EU values. The Coronavirus 
pandemic has made this 
authoritarian move and its 
impacts more visible. 
The use of war rhetoric by this 
government translates into an 
increasing military presence in 
strategic companies, critical 
industries and hospitals. 
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The latest law causing international uproar was put forward on 20 March 2020, when the 
government tabled a bill to fight the epidemic. Civil society organisations objected and 
opposition politicians condemned the bill. More than a 100,000 signed a protest letter.  
On 23 March 2020, the bill “on protecting against the Coronavirus” – termed the ‘Enabling 
Act’1– was debated in parliament through an urgent procedure. For a bill to pass via an urgent 
procedure, a four-fifths majority is needed, whereas Fidesz only has a two-thirds majority in 
parliament. It was expected therefore that the urgent procedure would fail, as the opposition 
would reject the bill. 
The political idea anyway was not to have it adopted, but to be able to blame the opposition 
for hindering the fight against the virus. Abandoning the idea of an urgent procedure and 
following the ordinary rules, the law was easily passed by the requisite parliamentary majority 
of two-thirds on 30 March 2020. It was immediately signed by the President of the State and 
published in the Official Gazette as Act XII of 2020. 
Lawmakers envisaged that parliament might not be able to convene, and therefore the Act, 
while not suspending parliament, introduces rule by Executive Decree, without a sunset clause, 
i.e. for an indefinite period. The enforcement of statutory provisions can be suspended or 
abrogated, and additional extraordinary measures can be implemented by decree. 
The government will brief parliament on a regular basis on the steps taken; should parliament 
later indeed be suspended, the Speaker of the House and party group leaders would be 
informed. The law makes the opposition voiceless and invisible.  
The constitutional requirement enshrined in Article 53(3) of the Fundamental Law for the 
government to extend a state of danger upon a parliamentary authorisation has been 
overwritten by the ruling parliamentary supermajority giving carte blanche authorisation for 
the future. The ‘Enabling Act’ has now extended the decrees’ 
applicability until a parliamentary majority repeals them, i.e. until 
Fidesz has a simple majority in parliament. Parliament may in 
theory withdraw this authorisation, but it is a highly unlikely 
scenario as long as Fidesz is in government. 
The Act incorporates a provision on necessity and proportionality in Article 2(2). But this is of 
little relevance, since Article 54(1) of the Fundamental Law allows for the abandonment of 
these principles under a special legal order – including a ‘state of danger’ – except for very few 
rights such as human dignity, the prohibition of torture and some procedural guarantees.  
Midterm elections and referenda must not be held during the state of danger.  
Importantly, an amendment to the Criminal Code (Article 337) makes it a crime for anyone 
before grand public claiming or spreading a falsehood or distorted truth in relation to the 
 
1 The term ‘Enabling Act’ is now used unanimously by all Hungarian media sources, scholars, politicians and 
indirectly by the Hungarian government (Hungarian Government, 2020b). It invokes the darkest memories of 
European past. Hitler’s Ermächtigungsgesetz was adopted in 1933 on the exact same day. 
The Enabling Act introduces  
rule by executive decree for  
an indefinite period and makes 
Hungary’s parliamentary 
opposition voiceless and invisible. 
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emergency in a manner that is capable of alarming or agitating a large group of people at the 
site of the emergency. Punishment is up to three years of imprisonment. Should the same 
behaviour in an extraordinary situation jeopardise or prevent the efficiency of protection, the 
sanction is one to five years of imprisonment.  
This provision has been criticised for being open to abuse. That is especially so given that the 
independence of the judiciary is compromised and the office of the prosecutor also suffers 
several shortcomings – for going after the remaining 
independent journalists reporting about the disease and its 
handling in an already distorted media landscape in the country 
(Bárd and Bayer, 2016).  
Another amendment to the Criminal Code (Article 322/A) 
targets those who obstruct government measures to fight an epidemic with imprisonment of 
up to three years. Even though the government insists that the measures are ‘temporary’, and 
will only last as long as the epidemic lasts, the duration is entirely up to Orbán, and the criminal 
law measures are permanent changes to the Criminal Code.  
Hungary’s Constitutional Court, which is discussed in Article 5 of the ‘Enabling Act’, is a 
theoretical check on governmental powers. Its switch to operating online – unlike that of 
parliament – is foreseen. But since 2011, in practice it has been nothing but the puppet of the 
government. It is not a meaningful check. Even if it were, there is no actio popularis any more, 
i.e. for a constitutional complaint to be filed, applicants’ direct involvement in the controversy 
is required, meaning that cases have to go through ordinary courts 
first, which in turn have limited operations due to the pandemic. 
So, it became increasingly difficult for a constitutional complaint to 
effectively reach the HCC.  
The individuals who can submit files to the HCC are serving at 
captured institutions and therefore are unlikely to make this move. 
A quarter of the MPs may also file a complaint, however, due to the capture of the HCC, they 
are unlikely to succeed.  
4. Teleological rule of law in action 
The novelty of the ‘Enabling Act’ is that through it, the Hungarian government has abandoned 
even the semblance of democracy. One could decipher the real relevance of laws by checking 
their objectives against Martin Krygier’s teleology of the rule of law. His claim is that the rule of 
law is about tempering power and arbitrariness (Krygier, 2016). If this is not the objective of a 
law, then it should be constitutionally suspect. With the ‘Enabling Act’, this tedious exercise can 
be spared and the bad faith of the lawmaker is obvious. 
The alleged public policy goal of the Hungarian authorities has been to address the pandemic. 
As Justice Minister Judit Varga stated, “the measures Hungary has taken are necessary, 
proportionate and limited to fighting the pandemic” (Varga, 2020). Fidesz officials rather 
An amendment of the Criminal 
Code poses challenges to 
freedom of expression and media 
pluralism and is open to abuse. 
Hungary’s Constitutional Court is 
no longer independent from  
the government and does not 
constitute an effective judicial 
check on executive action. 
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arrogantly dismiss any doubt about this and government criticism, by invoking the state of 
danger and contending that this is their only priority now. As Minister of State Zoltán Kovács 
said, “we’re in a state of emergency, by the way. Lives are at stake” (Kovács, 2020). 
Orbán also used very plain language when addressing – or rather refusing to address – the 
concerns of the European People’s Party secretary general: “With all due respect, I have no 
time for this!” And in his response to the concerns formulated by the secretary general of the 
Council of Europe, Orbán finishes this line of thought: “If you can’t help, the least you can do is 
not hinder us”.  
But if the government’s objectives were honest, why was there a need to do away with 
parliament, which is anyway on the government’s side? Fidesz had all the tools and power 
available to fight the virus even before adopting the ‘Enabling Act’. The use of extraordinary 
powers would have been agreed by the opposition, as long as 
there was a temporal limit to it. Logically, there must have 
been different objectives – serving many interests – behind 
insisting on an indeterminate period of the state of danger. 
If we look at the government’s first steps, our suspicion about 
hidden objectives becomes justified. The real aim seems to be a power grab and even more 
control of government criticism on the one hand, and scapegoating on the other. The 
Hungarian state has been labelled a kleptocracy, with little money left for health care (The 
Economist, 2018). Hospitals and medical personnel are gravely underfinanced. Should the 
epidemic hit Hungary hard, the system is highly unlikely to be able to tackle it.  
And for this critical political scenario, as usual, a scapegoat is needed. For once, refugees do 
not serve this purpose; George Soros is still referenced frequently but this has become 
increasingly embarrassing, especially since he has donated €1 million to Budapest to fight the 
epidemic. Thus, it is more important than ever to have a grip on journalists potentially reporting 
the government’s handling of the pandemic and able to transmit the message that the 
opposition objects to it.  
Other steps include classifying business deals with China; constructing a museum quarter in the 
capital, which has so far been subject to a long and bitter controversy between Budapest City 
Council and the government; providing free real estate to a foundation belonging to Mária 
Schmidt, a close Fidesz ally and historian contributing heavily to Fidesz’s identity politics; and 
increasing the number of supervisory board members over theatres from three to five, with 
three being appointed by the state. And the list goes on (Hungarian Spectrum, 2020).  
Another controversy relates to government measures that will prevent transgender people 
from having their gender correspond to their identity on official documents after transitioning 
(Euractiv, 2020). As a consequence, they will not be able to change their names either. Such a 
move is not only irrelevant from the viewpoint of the pandemic, but is also contrary to the case 
law established two decades ago by the European Court of Human Rights.  
The declaration of indefinite 
extraordinary powers serves other 
government interests than those of 
addressing the Covid-19 pandemic. 
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Concrete legal steps were made to gain political and financial profits. Through Decree 
128/2020, the government brought the packaging company Kartonpack under state control. 
Once the decree was published, the government commissioner in charge of Kartonpack fired 
the board of directors without consulting the shareholders – an obligation under Hungarian 
company law – and replaced them with new ones, the majority of whom are important Fidesz 
members (Halmai and Scheppele, 2020). 
The government issued Decree 135/2020 ruling that “special economic zones” could be created 
in areas deemed to be of national importance. In these areas, the local industry tax will not be 
collected by the town municipalities in the future, but by the county administration. With 
Decree 136/2020, the government established one such zone in a town with an opposition 
mayor, the city of Göd, where a large Samsung company is located. Göd consequently loses the 
business tax that was earlier collected from Samsung – which is one-third of its overall budget 
(Karsai, 2020). 
A further likely objective is testing the self-declared system of illiberalism by “giving up any 
pretence of being a democratic leader” (Washington Post, 2020). The ‘Enabling or 
Authorisation Act’ turns a “competitive autocracy [into] ‘authoritarianism without adjectives’” 
(Hegedüs, 2020). This move is important in building networks with other wannabe 
authoritarians to see how the EU reacts, or more importantly whether it reacts at all or if one 
can get away with an autocracy with impunity. In the event of EU inaction, it might “kick-start 
a constitutional pandemic”, and jeopardise the European Union (Uitz, 2020). 
5. EU responses so far 
The EU has acted like a paper tiger in the past. The building of an authoritarian regime in the 
heart of Europe has happened in broad daylight, with the EU unable to put a halt to backsliding, 
or even the enabling of backsliding via political and financial support. Responses to the 
‘Enabling Act’ illustrate this point too well.  
In an interview, Věra Jourová stated that the Commission “will have to wait and see how the 
increased emergency powers of the government are applied. So far the Hungarian emergency 
law is comparable with other laws in EU." Commission President Ursula von der Leyen gave a 
statement about the importance of values, but without mentioning Hungary expressly 
(European Commission, 2020a).  
A group of initially 13 member states issued a statement in a similar vein (Politico, 2020), but 
since they also failed to mention Hungary by name, in a rather sarcastic move, Hungary joined 
the signatories, thereby ridiculing the whole action and rendering it meaningless (Hungarian 
Government, 2020a). As Justice Minister Varga cynically tweeted, the text “felt so empty 
without us”.  
This move probably made von der Leyen issue another statement calling the problem child by 
its name before she was trolled too, but did not go further than expressing her concern about 
the situation. The European People’s Party (EPP), which has been trying to eject Fidesz for more 
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than a year now, has been busy drawing and redrawing red lines that Fidesz never fails to cross, 
but cannot meaningfully sanction it.  
EU Justice Commissioner Didier Reynders promised to evaluate the new law with a special focus 
on the criminal law provisions. The Commission also emphasised the importance of free speech 
and journalism in times of crises. Yet, rule by decree should be treated at least as seriously as 
amendments to the Criminal Code (EUobserver, 2020).  
Thankfully, the Commission has also stressed that all emergency measures have to be 
temporary, and closely relate to the declared emergency they seek to tackle. But its action will 
only be successful if the Commission – and all other EU institutions for that matter – use the 
tools they have available by way of the Treaties.  
In this respect, it is notable that the informal video-conference of the EU ministers of justice 
organised under the Croatian Presidency on 6 April 2020 discussed the impact of the 
coronavirus pandemic on the judiciary (Croatian Presidency, 2020). The ministers of justice 
underlined that “any extraordinary measures taken should be in line with the fundamental 
values of the Union”, and acknowledged the European Commission’s first Rule of Law Annual 
Report expected to be published during September 2020 (European Commission, 2020b; 
European Commission, 2020c). 
The Council of Europe Venice Commission concluded that past experience has shown how the 
gravest human rights violations happened during declared “states of emergency” (CoE Venice 
Commission, 1995). As the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) Director Michael O’Flaherty, 
writing in a FRA Bulletin on the “Coronavirus Pandemic in the EU – Fundamental Rights 
Implications” argues, “the current situation powerfully 
underlines that human rights and public health are not an 
‘either/or’ choice” (FRA, 2020).  
The argument that this is “not the moment to pick a fight” is ill 
advised (New York Times, 2020). This is even more so as the end 
of the Covid-19 pandemic cannot be foretold. If there is one 
lesson to be learned from rule of law backsliding in Hungary over the past 10 years, it is that 
time is on the side of those who want to dismantle the values of Article 2 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU). Responding later will be too late. 
6. Conclusions and recommendations 
The EU has a plethora of instruments ready to be deployed any time as part of an EU rule of 
law toolkit. These instruments might not compel authoritarian governments to make a U-turn, 
but they could slow down constitutional capture. It could put an end to dismantling the EU from 
within and also to the absurd situation of supporting autocracies in violation of EU values out 
of EU funds. 
The EU has been so far unable to 
halt rule of law backsliding by the 
Hungarian government. Timely  
and effective enforcement of EU 
values must take preference over 
diplomatic strategies. 
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Currently, all EU institutions, including the Commission as the guardian of the Treaties, continue 
to believe in the force of political dialogue, and prefer this over other techniques of enforcing 
application of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU.  
All EU institutions must recognise that the discursive approach might work well with the 
member states that voluntarily respect the rules of the game and in the overall assessment 
adhere – in both the letter of the law and practice – to the concept of ‘liberal democracy’. But 
when it comes to systemic rule of law backsliding, with governments consciously and 
instrumentally engaging in dismantling constitutional checks and balances, the effectiveness of 
any EU reaction hinges on its response or enforcement.  
After a decade of rule of law violations by the Hungarian government and with several other 
member states showing similar developments, EU institutions must realise that any other 
approach is entirely ineffective vis-à-vis rogue governments. Prolonged, fruitless procedures 
only grant sufficient time for governments to complete state capture. Once this happens, it is 
extremely difficult to revert to constitutionalism and reintroduce constraints on state power.  
One of the most promising ways to deal with rule of law backsliding seems to be rule of law 
infringement procedures (Bárd and Śledzińska-Simon, 2019). Once the negotiating phase 
proves fruitless, in cases with a rule of law element, the Commission should without delay turn 
to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Luxembourg, which again should 
prioritise and accelerate the procedure, and introduce interim measures.  
This has happened recently in three Polish cases: i) the unlawful logging of trees in the 
Białowieża Forest; ii) the attempted capture of the Supreme Court; and most recently, iii) with 
regard to the powers of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court (CJEU, Orders European 
Commission v Poland). Preferably, the CJEU should also consider the use of dissuasive lump- 
sum penalties for non-compliance. Such rule of law infringement procedures are particularly 
important in the face of EU institutions being of little use in halting or reversing rule of law 
backsliding in the member states.  
There should be room for member states under review to present their arguments and 
evidence underpinning their positions. But once it becomes clear that a government is acting 
in bad faith, the EU institutions should acknowledge that any delay in rendering a condemning 
judgment may cause irreparable damage to the EU legal system and individuals. 
The Council, the Commission and the European Parliament have been developing and fine-
tuning their own instruments on member states’ compliance with Article 2 TEU principles 
(Council of the EU, 2019; European Commission 2019; European Parliament, 2020). The 
emerging picture is one of competing tools, with different EU institutional actors claiming to 
know best about Article 2 TEU risks and threats.  
Moreover, they also present major differences regarding their material scope. Contrary to the 
European Parliament’s recommendation, the Commission’s forthcoming Rule of Law Report 
will not cover aspects related to democracy and fundamental rights, such as crucial issues 
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related to minorities’ protection, including antigypsyism (Carrera et al., 2019; van Ballegooij, 
2020). 
While it is a welcome and necessary step that each EU Institution, including the European 
Parliament, equips itself with the best independent knowledge and research, their efforts 
should ultimately come together under the umbrella of a 
single, consistent EU Periodic Review (EUPR) of the state of 
the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights (Carrera, 
2019). 
This should be based on a clear legal framework shaped by an 
interinstitutional agreement between the Commission, the 
Council and the European Parliament flowing from Article 295 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU), which would lay out the specific arrangements for cooperation 
(European Parliament, 2016). An agreement would ensure a legally binding commitment and 
an equal say by all the relevant actors involved – in line with EU better law-making guidelines 
and the interinstitutional balance principle – and judicial oversight by the Luxembourg Court. 
The analysis backing up EU institutions’ rule of law assessment must be based on independent 
research and scientifically-driven, and take into account impacts on EU legal system 
specificities, such as the principle of mutual recognition (Carrera and Mitsilegas, 2018). The 
EUPR would cover all EU member states and provide a qualitative (country-specific) assessment 
of rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights-related issues by Union members as well as 
the EU institutions (European Parliament Research Service, 2016). The results should be made 
public. A key challenge will be to preserve the EUPR’s autonomy and legitimacy when 
governments – and the various EU institutions – accuse it of being political and non-neutral.  
Therefore, a particularly strong emphasis should be placed on 
solid treaty bases, legitimacy, and accountability; a variety of 
sources should feed into the system, and at the same time a 
neutral decision-making body should be at the core of regular, 
context-specific analyses of all aspects of the rule of law, 
democracy and fundamental rights. Equal treatment of 
member states should also be cautiously respected so as not to give the impression that 
governments can be given preference or disadvantaged on a geopolitical basis or purely 
because some rogue governments are shielded by their political party groups in the European 
Parliament.  
On the basis of such an assessment, the burden of proof should shift to all national 
governments to justify and provide evidence of the goals and (intended/unintended) effects of 
their policies in light of Article 2 TEU commitments (Bárd et al., 2016). Such an exercise should 
be transparent and open to the public.  
Even at times of a declared state of emergency, governments must justify the lawfulness of 
national measures in light of both their necessity (effectiveness) and legitimacy in a democratic 
society (International Commission of Jurists, 1985). Interference with constitutional checks and 
The EU should adopt a periodic 
review, anchored in a legally binding 
interinstitutional agreement so as  
to comply with EU Better Regulation 
Guidelines and the Principle of 
Interinstitutional Balance. 
The EUPR should be based on 
independent research that provides 
a country-specific qualitative 
diagnosis and shifts the burden of 
proof to all national governments 
and relevant EU institutions. 
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balances, and fundamental rights, must be the least intrusive and underpinned by scientific 
knowledge. 
As underlined by Secretary General of the Council of Europe Marija Pejčinović Burić, and the 
CoE Toolkit for member states for “respecting democracy, rule of law and human rights  in the 
framework of the COVID-19 sanitary crisis”, during a declared state of emergency EU 
governments must also ensure the principle of legality, and guarantee parliamentary oversight, 
independent judicial control and effective domestic 
remedies (Council of Europe, 2020).  
As evidenced in this paper, this has not been the case with 
the Hungarian government. Governments must also refrain 
from distorting or withholding information, and the EU 
could proactively contribute to whistleblowers’ protection 
and put a halt to the abuse of litigation against journalists 
by adopting anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) legislation. 
Rule of law conditionality in distributing funds would put an end to the absurdity of the EU 
financing autocracies. Suspending funds to a member state will always be deliberately 
misinterpreted by rogue governments, but such a move during an epidemic is even more 
dangerous. The Commission should nevertheless adhere to what it preached back in 2014 in 
its guidance on ensuring respect for the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
when implementing the European structural and investment funds, and at least require the 
existence of an independent judiciary capable of examining complaints concerning the 
distribution of funds. 
The Union has to realise that there is an existential need for it to react firmly. All institutions 
must accept that the survival of the Union and its core functioning principles, such as primacy, 
direct effect, loyalty and mutual recognition, are at stake. It is impossible to uphold European 
integration as we know it without taking the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights 
seriously. 
  
Governments must comply with  
the rule of law, democracy and 
fundamental rights, even and most 
crucially at times of declared 
emergencies. They must justify why 
national measures are proportionate 
and legitimate in a democratic society. 
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